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This paper explores the conclusions of recent research on the ethics of war 
in Chinese traditional political thought, asking how they have been shaped by 
understandings of the nature, meaning and significance of global ethical di-
versity. After outlining the major contours of Chinese traditional ethics of war, 
we propose that the significance of this material has been understood within 
the terms of both liberal and communitarian meta-ethical assumptions. These 
assumptions have shaped how the relationship between Chinese and West-
ern traditions has been understood, limiting this research in unhelpful ways. 
While liberal assumptions lead to authors discounting the distinctiveness of 
Chinese traditions, communitarian approaches seek to find common ground 
between traditions to mitigate the danger of intercultural conflict. The common 
ground solution is ultimately undermined by the communitarian assumptions 
that made it seem urgent. In response to these problems, we propose that a 
more radically communitarian mode of engagement should guide the compar-
ative dimension of research into non-Western ethics of war.
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W hile much of the revival of interest in the ethics of war has focused on predominantly Western traditions of thought – realism, pacifism, and 
just war theory – an increasing number of scholars are turning their attention 
to non-Western ethical traditions and asking how, and to what extent, they 
influence the use of force and what, if anything, they might have in common 
with Western traditions and with each other (for a survey, see Johnson 2008). 
There is a growing body of work describing discourses of legitimate force in 
Muslim (Johnson and Kelsay 1991; Milton-Edwards 1992; Kelsay 1993; Johnson 
1997; Bonney 2004; Cook 2005; Heck 2005; Abou El Fadl 2006; Bonner 
2006), Buddhist (Bartholemeusz 1999; 2002; Gombrich 2006; Premasiri 2006; 
Jerryson 2009; Jayasuriya 2009; Jerryson and Juergensmeyer 2010), and 
Hindu traditions (Brekke 2005; 2006). 
This interest has been driven in part by an increasing sensitivity to the cultural 
and historical contexts of political discourse, and attention to the role of non-
Western and non-secular voices and discourses in political life, but a particularly 
important context has been the globalization of ethics (Sullivan and Kymlicka 
2007). Ethical debate is increasingly transnational and global, both in the 
problems it identifies, and the nature of the communities and networks in which 
it takes place, and in some cases in the ethical frameworks aspired to. Attention 
to non-Western ethics of war has in many cases involved a comparative 
dimension, relating the traditions in question to the Western just war tradition 
in particular. This can to some extent be understood as an aid to understanding, 
translating unfamiliar thought forms into the more familiar categories of the just 
war tradition to orient readers new to the topic. But there is also strong practical 
concern that animates much of this research, about the challenges of ethical 
diversity. The great range of religious and cultural traditions from which people 
around the world draw moral guidance can make discussion of shared concerns 
difficult, and promote conflict as well as cooperation. Finding points of contact 
and avenues for communication between traditions is likely to be an important 
dimension of future research in this area. However, the terms and goals of 
intercultural ethical encounter are not self-evident, and how it is understood can 
affect not only the terms of the encounter, but also what is seen as significant in 
the traditions themselves.
This paper explores these issues through recent work on Chinese traditional 
ethics of war, asking specifically how the relationship between Chinese 
and Western traditions has been understood in this literature, and how 
these understandings have shaped research in this area. We argue that the 
relationships between Chinese and Western ethics of war has been mediated in 
this literature by both liberal and communitarian meta-ethical understandings. 
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The former risks, in theory and practice, discounting genuine ethical diversity, 
while the latter has involved a search for common ethical themes and 
principles that is likely to obscure more than it illuminates. The weakness of 
communitarian approaches in this literature is explained as a failure to fully 
develop the implications of the communitarian position; this in turn points the 
way to a more viable understanding of what it might mean to study Chinese 
ethics of war with a comparative dimension.
The paper begins with a summary of recent research in the Chinese ethics of 
war. The next two sections contextualize approaches to ethical diversity in this 
literature against the background of liberal and communitarian understandings 
of ethics and cultural diversity in the ethics of war literature more broadly. The 
final two sections develop two criticisms of how communitarian approaches have 
encouraged a search for ethical common ground. 
CHINESE ETHICS OF WAR: THREE TRADITIONS
A growing body of research since the turn of the century has provided ample 
evidence that Chinese traditional political thought developed a sophisticated 
body of ethical thought on war (Ching 2004; Ivanhoe 2004; Bell 2006; Lewis 
2006; Lo 2015; Liu 2014; Lo 2012; Twiss and Chan 2012a; 2012b; Stalnaker 
2012). At least three different paradigms in Chinese moral thinking on war can 
be identified according to these studies: Confucian, Mohist, and Taoist ethics 
of war. While these three traditions each have apparent points of contact with 
Western traditions, they are sufficiently different to raise difficult questions 
about the potential for a shared global standard in the use of force that can be 
equally endorsed from Chinese and Western cultural standpoints. 
The most prominent and influential paradigm in the Chinese ethics of war is 
the Confucian (Bell 2006; Liu 2014; Twiss and Chan 2012a; 2012b). It can be 
summarized as follows. First, Confucianism urges caution in waging war and 
condemns aggressive wars for territorial expansion or for material gain. Mencius 
famously states that “there is no just war during the Spring and Autumn Period” 
in the Eastern Zhou dynasty, a period marked by the collapse of the feudal 
system of the Zhou dynasty, a time in which royal authority was ebbing away, 
and regional warlords annexed smaller states around them to expand their 
territories and consolidate their power. This period is commonly understood as 
a situation analogous to a Hobbesian realist world of international relations, and 
Mencius’ work in this context is regarded as a criticism of positions analogous to 
political realism in the contemporary sense. 
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However, as Twiss and Chan (2012) remind us, Confucianism does not involve 
pacifism or a commitment to nonviolence. Confucius and his followers, especially 
Mencius and Xunzi, do not deny the permissibility of war in all situations; they 
accept the idea that waging a war for a noble cause is possible. Specifically, they 
permit the legitimate use of military force for the sake of self-defense against 
invasion, and encourage the rightful authority to punish criminal behavior and 
stop aggressors who unjustly attack smaller states. Confucian rhetoric on war 
and ethics stresses how important it is that the acts of those who disrupt peace 
and harmony should be sanctioned, and that war should be righteous, fought for 
the sake of maintaining order.
The right to wage war lies only with the true king who has received the 
heavenly mandate – the Son of Heaven. It is wrong for dukes or princes to wage 
war. As Liu (2014) quotes Confucius’ remark that “If it accords the Tao (rules) 
of the world, the rites, music and war should be dominated by the emperor” 
(quoted in Liu 2014, 560-561). However, the true king is considered legitimate 
only if he reigns over his people through the power of his moral authority, and 
takes the welfare of his people as his primary responsibility. Therefore, when 
state rule devolves into tyranny, the ruler loses his heavenly mandate and 
there is no ethical warrant prohibiting his overthrow. According to Mencius, 
such a king could be removed by force by a new legitimate ruler wielding the 
Mandate of Heaven. Twiss and Chan (2012a) argue that this classical Confucian 
understanding of a punitive expedition against a tyrant is akin to and can be 
compared to the modern idea of humanitarian intervention. On this basis, they 
conclude that there is some overlap between the Confucian and Western models 
of just war.
The Mohist school – the first major intellectual rival to Confucius and his 
followers at that time – provides the earliest text in the Chinese tradition that 
systematically and comprehensively addresses the ethical conditions under 
which warfare can be justified. Mozi – the founder of the school who was active 
from the late 5th to the early 4th centuries B.C.E – is renowned for his pacifist 
stance, opposing offensive warfare. As noted by Chris Fraser (2016), Mohism 
adopts a consequentialist argument in which acts are ultimately judged by the 
states of affairs they bring about. Accordingly, whether a war can be justified is 
determined by what “promotes the benefit of all under heaven and eliminates 
harm to all under heaven” (cited in Fraser 2016, 142). It is importantly noted 
that the term “the benefit of all under heaven” implies an “impartial love” – or 
jian ai 兼愛 – that is, one ought to be concerned for the welfare of people without 
making distinctions between self and other, between friends and enemies, and 
between associates and strangers. 
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The term ai 愛, as Loy elaborates (2013, 489), “take a sense that ranges from 
‘to love,’ to ‘have concerned for,’ to ‘to care for,’ even ‘to be sparing with.’” 
Within the Mozi, ai  is closely associated with li  利 (to benefit): the two terms 
are sometimes conjoined.” The term jian means “to combine or unite,” which is 
opposed to the term bie 別 – partiality, or “to separate and divide…in particular, 
to separate out a part from a whole or to divide a whole into parts, and by 
extension ‘to distinguish,’ or to ‘discriminate’” (ibid). To Mozi, the partiality 
is the cause of all social and political ills. The term “impartial love” therefore 
refers to inclusively and in indiscriminately care for the benefit of the cosmos 
— heaven, ghosts, and people, and can serve as the panacea for all social and 
political problems including the problem of war. As Mozi notes, “if men were to 
regard the countries of others as they regard their own, then who would raise up 
his country to attack the country of another?’’ (16/9–10, cited in Wong and Loy 
2004, 343). As consequences, in considering the justification of warfare we must 
consider the benefits and harms to everyone affected, not only ourselves or our 
compatriots. We should weight these harms for both sides, and Mozi argued that 
by this measure war is nearly always wrong, as the waste in lives and resources 
and disruption social order is rarely balanced by sufficiently good effects. 
Although war is nearly always wrong, to Mozi, it is obvious that some wars are 
justifiable. Mozi himself was actively involved in several military adventures. He 
gathered an army of idealistic warriors, traveling from one crisis zone to another 
to aid small states under attack by larger powers. There is a story that he once 
walked for ten days and night to the powerful southern state of Chu in time to 
forestall an attack on the small central state of Song. Mozi differentiates three 
types of wars in his writings, namely: aggressive wars (gong 攻), defensive wars 
(shou 守), punitive wars (zhu 誅). According to Mozi, aggressive wars against 
innocent states are not justifiable because they are harmful to humankind as 
a whole. Defensive wars can however be morally justified since they promote 
benefit or reduce harm to humanity. Self-defence isn’t an unconditional right 
or duty though; as Fraser notes (2016, 143), Mohist ethical theory enjoins 
surrendering one’s state without resistance if the costs of defensive warfare are 
too high. However, these costs had to be weighed against the often-horrifying 
consequences of invasion in Mozi’s time, which often involved the pillaging or 
destruction of the defeated state’s resources, and the enslavement or murder of 
its people (ibid.). It should also be noted that in Mozi’s writing, defensive war 
includes the defense of other small states which are targeted by aggressive larger 
states. The virtuous ruler undertakes military action to defend other states from 
aggression (Wong and Loy 2004, 343), a notion in some ways is akin to the 
contemporary idea of collective punishment of aggressors mandated by a UN 
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Security Council resolution. Some forms of non-defensive war can therefore also 
be morally justifiable, an argument which is linked to the third type of war, the 
punitive war. 
According to Mozi, war can be justifiable under the following three scenarios, 
that correspond roughly to the Western category of just cause: (1) a state falling 
into great disorder, (2) a state attacking other states, and (3) a state inflicting 
atrocities on its people. Mozi explains this latter type of warfare by citing the 
examples of the sage-kings Yu, Tang, and Wu, and in doing so criticizes the 
princes and kings of his time who used the example of these figures to justify 
military aggression. Mozi admired these figures as moral paragons who also 
embarked on military campaigns. As Wong and Loy (2004, 346) point out, Mozi 
was able to square his respect for the sage-kings as models of ideal conduct with 
their offensive military campaigns by making a distinction between wars of 
aggression and punitive missions. The sage-kings’ wars were punitive missions, 
and thus no stain on their righteousness (ibid.). 
By what criteria can these two kinds of war can be distinguished? According to 
Fraser, a punitive war was waged with the intention to promote the benefit of all 
rather than in pursuit of self-interest (2016, 153). More important was that the 
war should be initiated by a proper authority (2016, 152):
The first and most prominent condition justifying these punitive wars is that all 
were purportedly conducted with divine sanction. According to legend, Heaven 
(tian 天) expressed its condemnation of the targets of the punitive missions 
through miraculous portents, including freak weather, crop failure, midnight 
sun, rains of blood and flesh, screeching ghosts and animals, and fantastic 
creatures, such as a giant bird with a human head. 
Authority to sanction war lay not with kings or princes, but with Heaven itself, 
whose judgement would be plain to all in its very public manifestations. Similar 
auguries and omens in messages carries by spirits would announce the certain 
success of the military campaign. Fraser (2016) argues that these elements 
of Mozi’s thought “overlap significantly with mainstream views today of the 
conditions for jus ad bellum,” and specifically with contemporary criteria of just 
cause, right intention, proper authority, and reasonable chance of success (152, 
154). 
Taoism is another influential school that has shaped ethical thinking on war 
in China. Many Chinese readings of the Tao-te Ching  道德經 – the first and 
most important classical work of Taoism containing teachings attributed to 
Laozi – take it as a military text, or at least a military-oriented text. It has had a 
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huge influence on the Military School’s ethical thinking in China. Cleary (2000) 
argues that one of the most influential military texts, the Sunzi Bingfa, can only 
be understood by reading it side by side with texts like the Tao-te Ching and the 
I Ching 易經. He states that 
[T]he importance of understanding the Taoist element of The Art of War can 
hardly be exaggerated. Not only is this classic of strategy permeated with the 
ideas of great Taoist works such as the I Ching (The Book of Changes) and 
the Tao-te Ching (The Way and Its Power), but it reveals the fundamentals of 
Taoism as the ultimate source of all the traditional Chinese martial arts. (Clearly 
2000, 3) 
Cleary interprets the text of Sun Tzu as defensive Taoist in character (Johnston 
1999, 4), and suggests that Sunzi Bingfa is “permeated with the philosophical 
and political thought of the Tao-te Ching” (Cleary 2000, 20).
Just as Confucianism is very cautious about waging war, Taoism similarly 
opposes aggressive actions or “intentional” expansion by state rulers. From a 
Taoist perspective, warfare is essentially bad because it violates the fundamental 
principle of the Tao. The primary concern of Taoism is “to preserve life and 
avoid harm and danger in the human world” (Fung 1966, 99, quoted in Zhang 
2012). War is therefore a deviation from the natural state of peace and harmony. 
Taoism is well known for its critique of human desires, and it is skeptical about 
any kind of offensive action. As Ellen Zhang noted, aggressive behaviors like 
war are normally caused by three kinds of desires: (1) the desire to possess more 
(wealth); (2) the desire to be recognized by others (name); and (3) the desire 
to control others (power) (Zhang 2012, 483). In order to keep human behavior 
in accordance with nature, Daoism proposes an idea of “no-contentiousness” 
(buzheng  不爭) and “no-action” (wuwei  無為), as a way of approaching the 
alternating cycles of nature and the possibility of harmony and peace. Zhang 
notes that 
No-contentiousness, like many other negations in the Tao-te Ching  such 
as non-action, non-desire, non-name, non-knowledge, no-thing, no-mind, 
no-authority, no-contentiousness, no-martial action, no-anger, and so on, 
marks a fundamental moral vision that centers on a conscious critique of 
societal competitions and the heroic ideal of being the strongest through an 
employment of extreme means. 
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Hence, Zhang concludes that the Tao-te Ching deals directly with anti-war 
themes which can be summarized in the following three basic arguments: 
(1) The onto-cosmological argument: War poses a disruption of the natural 
pattern of things in the world. (2) The moral argument: Preserving life is 
morally right and killing is morally wrong. (3) The political argument: It is 
wrong to employ war as a means to political gain since warfare will inflict great 
sorrow upon the state and its people, as well as the ruler. (Zhang 2012, 481)
While Taoism is firmly committed to peace and harmony, it recognizes the 
need to use force when there is no other choice (last resort). According to Zhang, 
the Tao-te Ching also speaks of ethical considerations in the conduct of war, 
taking measures to avoid unwanted violence and its inevitable repercussions. It 
is in this sense that Zhang contends that Taoism is not pacifism. It accepts the 
fact that war is sometimes inevitable in certain circumstances, even though it 
also insists that war always involves loss and should be undertaken only as a last 
resort, with the objective of restoring “the primordial naturalness” (Zhang 2012, 
486). The only legitimate warfare Taoism accepts is war in self-defense. 
In contrast to the Confucian paradigm, then, Taoism rejects any idea 
analogous to the contemporary theory and practice of humanitarian intervention 
or responsibility to protect (R2P). This rejection, according to Zhang, is closely 
linked to Taoism’s “philosophical distrust of the very notion of ‘righteousness’” 
(Zhang 2012, 488). As noted by Zhang,
The Tao-te Ching does not present the idea of “righteous war” since the very 
notion entails the idea that such a war is good and the Tao-te Ching seems to 
reject such a judgment. That is why the Tao-te Ching insists on “getting rid of 
righteousness.” (Zhang 2012, 488)
In summary, Taoism insists that warfare has negative impacts even if the war 
is well intentioned at the beginning, and the rhetoric of rightness is often little 
more than a rhetorical device to serve the person who uses it. 
The growing literature on Chinese ethics of war has made a valuable 
contribution to our understanding of the cultural regulation of war. It has 
demonstrated the existence of a sophisticated and influential body of thought 
that predates the Western just war tradition, and differs significantly in emphasis 
at times even if it has intriguing parallels. None of the research summarized 
above is offered by its authors as being of merely historical interest though; all 
of it is in one way or another concerned with the contemporary significance of 
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Chinese ethical traditions for thinking about war in the twenty-first century. 
The comparative element in much of this work, in which the content of Chinese 
traditions is coordinated with key themes and categories of Western ethics of 
war, suggests that for many scholars, the contemporary significance of this 
work must be understood in the context of the globalization of ethics. This is a 
very reasonable assumption. The critique of Western ideas and practices as the 
achievements of one civilization among others rather than universal inheritance 
of humankind, combined with the increasingly transnational and cross-cultural 
nature of debates about the rights and wrongs of war, suggest that those engaged 
in systematic exploration of the ethical dimensions of war must reckon not only 
with the internal grammar of particular traditions, but also with the meaning 
and significance of ethical diversity at the global level and what it might mean to 
reflect on and apply particular traditions in light of this global ethical diversity. 
The emergent research on Chinese ethics of war already presupposes certain 
positions on these meta-ethical questions. In the remainder of this paper, we locate 
these positions against the background of liberal and communitarian approaches 
to pluralism in the ethics of war more generally, and suggest that the limits of these 
approaches may also be constraining further development of this field.
 LIBERAL APPROACHES TO CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE ETH-
ICS OF WAR
A notable feature of the post-1970s revival in ethical reflection on war in 
the West has been the reworking of the just war tradition in the idioms and 
emphases of a liberal, post-Enlightenment moral philosophy (Rengger 2002; 
O’Driscoll 2013). Characteristic of this tradition is the notion of autonomous 
human reason as the final arbiter in moral questions, unconstrained by the 
arbitrary prejudices of religion, tradition, and culture. Uwe Steinhoff (2007, 
1-2) leaves us in no doubt about where he stands on this issue: “When it comes 
to ethical questions of some importance—and war and terrorism probably are 
phenomena of some importance—one is well advised to advance philosophical 
analysis against common points of view and to question pre-existing, socially 
established frameworks of discussion and prejudices, instead of docilely 
accepting them.” To take one’s moral ideas from common sense is irresponsible; 
to take them from a religious tradition displays the “perverted and ignorant” 
attitude of the pre-Enlightenment age (ibid.). 
Ethical diversity may be anthropologically significant from this perspective. 
One might trace how ethical principles were developed in response to 
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technological advances and political change within particular societies, or 
reflected the emphases of a particular religious tradition, or how they directed 
and constrained the actual practice of war. Cultural and religious diversity, and 
its associated ethical diversity, is a contingent rather than necessary feature of 
world politics though. It is contingent on those in thrall to common sense and 
religious tradition remaining so, rather than setting aside such prejudices and 
adopting reliable standards of ethical judgment. 
Whatever historical and anthropological significance these norms may have, 
they should not be confused with our ethical obligations in relation to war. 
These obligations are accessible to reason and universally binding on all rational 
beings. They may have first been articulated in a specific time or place, but they 
bear no trace of their origins, express no particular culture or interest. The task 
of the ethicist, as opposed to the anthropologist, is to abstract away from both 
the local circumstances that provided the original occasion for the development 
of ethical constraints on war, and the particular traditions of belief and practice 
in whose language they were articulated and justified, to discover universally 
valid and generalizable principles. 
This general way of relating reason and tradition has sustained a number of 
different approaches to ethical diversity, some of which have informed recent 
work on Chinese ethics of war. One such response has been to treat cultural and 
religious traditions as a set of “resources” to be drawn on to address practical 
problems in the resort to and conduct of war. Thus Twiss and Chan ask what 
the Confucian tradition might have to contribute to contemporary discussions 
of humanitarian intervention. Exploring this tradition and its points of contact 
with Western thinking could
help current Chinese leadership to appreciate the rich intellectual resources 
within its history that could be put to use in thinking about how to respond 
to tyrannous situations in the contemporary world. By the same token, those 
in the modern West might (again, we stress ‘might’) find some of the ancient 
Confucian ideas associated with punitive expeditions useful in thinking about 
humanitarian intervention now and for the future. (Twiss and Chan 2012a, 82)
The Confucian tradition is approached here as a body of insights that can be 
detached from the broader network of social relationships, narratives, beliefs 
and practices in which they originally became meaningful, with no obstacle to 
their adoption by moral agents in quite different cultural contexts. The kind of 
moral subject that can assemble an ethical system from resources taken from a 
variety of cultural contexts is a moral subject whose judgement not constrained 
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by a “thick” context of interrelated narratives, beliefs and shared practices: an 
autonomous liberal subject for whom the only criteria for what is useful are 
subjective preference and impartial, universal reason. Daniel Bell’s endorsement 
of Mencius’ views as “more attractive” than contemporary Western versions of 
just war, over which it has “several advantages” rests on the same assumptions 
(2006). 
A second approach to ethical diversity is influenced by John Rawls’ idea of 
an “overlapping consensus” (Rawls 2005). For Rawls, the challenge of stable 
political cooperation among citizens divided by incommensurable philosophical, 
cultural and religious worldviews could be met by coming to a consensus on the 
basic political values that should govern society, a consensus that would then 
be embedded in the more comprehensive schemes of values and beliefs that 
shape other aspects of citizens’ lives. The consensus on political values would be 
arrived at through the exercise of reason alone: through a consideration of the 
principles rational and reasonable people would arrive at when they impartially 
reflect on fair terms of cooperation with their fellow citizens. It would then be 
down to individual citizens to relate this political conception of justice with their 
broader worldviews.
Rawls conception of an overlapping consensus has been a discernible 
influence in the literature comparing Western and Chinese ethics of war. While 
Rawls’ own version of the procedures through which the political conception of 
justice is arrived at have not been adopted, the more general notion of a “thin” 
morality arrived at through reason and then endorsed from within the terms of 
“thick” cultural traditions has. Daniel Bell, for example, suggests there is “rough 
agreement on the aims of a theory of just war – that it should prohibit wars of 
conquest and justify certain kinds of wars of self-defence and humanitarian 
interventions” (2006, 244). This shared consensus on basic just war principles 
is not dependent on any one set of political and philosophical justifications, 
but can be backed up with a variety of theories. Given this fact, “one should 
invoke the theory that is most psychologically compelling to the people being 
addressed” (ibid.), and “if Mencius’s theory leads to the same judgements 
regarding the justice of particular wars as theories of wartime morality founded 
on human rights, then why not deploy his theory in the Chinese context?” (2006, 
240). From this perspective, the ethical principles regulating war are principles 
that all reasonable people would endorse; the conventional cultural and religious 
traditions are merely a colourful overlay that make the more abstract basic 
principles of just war psychologically persuasive. In a similar fashion, Ted 
Gong argues that China has signed up to Western just war standards through 
its international legal obligations, but there are ample resources in Chinese 
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political and cultural traditions that can underwrite these principles from an 
authentically Chinese standpoint (Gong 1999). 
The criticisms of liberal models of ethics are well known. The communitarian 
critique charges that the rational “view from nowhere” aspired to by these kind 
of analytical approaches is impossible; we are always to a greater or lesser 
extent embedded in the language, beliefs and values of a particular culture or 
society, and while we can foreground our presuppositions and prejudices, we 
can never escape our historical situation entirely. As Gadamer (2004) argued, 
it is only through the pre-understandings shaped by culture and experience 
that we can project a meaning – moral or otherwise – for situations and events 
we encounter. Conceptions of justice are always embedded in forms of life, 
and derive their plausibility to some extent from the formation of subjects in a 
society structured by these conceptions of justice. Rather than achieving greater 
universality, then, the quest for more rational and tradition-free grounds for the 
ethics of war has often simply described the morality of modern Western liberal 
subjects and then taken this as the model for human morality in general. In 
spite of its hostility to tradition and pretentions to universality, Enlightenment 
liberalism is itself a particular tradition of moral inquiry (MacIntyre 1985; 1988). 
The Rawlsian idea of an overlapping consensus doesn’t escape these problems, 
because, in Rawls’ formulation at least, the overlapping consensus requires its 
participants to accept certain “thick” liberal understandings of the self (Barnhart 
2004). 
If Chinese ethics of war are approached from within the liberal framework, 
either as resources to be adopted or traditions to be mobilized in support of a 
supposedly universal overlapping consensus, the outcome is likely to involve one 
of two outcomes. Either it will result in the assimilation of Chinese traditions 
within the terms of Western liberal modernity, in which the categories of 
Chinese discourse are superficially present but the content has been transformed 
through its cooption, or elements of Chinese traditions will be selectively drawn 
on to support a “universal” ethics of war. In this scenario, Chinese traditions 
are stripped of their claims to embody distinctive modes of universality, as 
any elements that depart from Western moral knowledge are coded, in effect, 
as irrational local attachments or arbitrary customs. This critique of liberal 
approaches suggests that research on the Chinese ethics of war that adopts 
them risks distorting its subject matter and preventing a genuine, mutually 
challenging encounter between West and East by deciding its outcome before it 
has begun.
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COMMUNITARIAN APPROACHES TO CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN 
THE ETHICS OF WAR 
More promising are communitarian approaches. James Turner Johnson, one 
of the most prominent historians of the just war tradition, regards the cultural 
context of its emergence as crucial in shaping its content and form (Johnson 
1991; Johnson 2014, 41-84).
The deep roots of the just war tradition are in the customs, attitudes, and 
practices of the cultures that have principally fed it: those of the Hebraic 
world and the world of classical antiquity and, later, those of the Germanic 
societies of northern Europe. Even after the coalescence of just war ideas and 
practices into a coherent tradition (a phenomenon of the Middle Ages), much 
of the development of just war ideas and practices took place insularly within 
Western culture. (Johnson 1991, 6)
Johnson and other scholars interested in historical approaches share the belief 
that rules governing the use of force are always shaped within and mediated by 
culture, and only have meaning and authority for those who share them because 
they exist in a web of the broader web of inter-subjective meanings, narratives 
and self-understandings that constitute that culture. Johnson (1979, 98) has 
written that
In religious communities existing over time, values are encountered in history, 
given forms dependent on the historical experience of the believing community, 
and recalled by the individual moral agent through memory in the context of 
participation in that community.
Johnson and John Kelsay’s comparative work on just war and Islam was 
the earliest effort to engage in depth with non-Western ethics of war, pre-
dating the post-9/11 explosion of interest in the concept of jihad by more than 
a decade (Johnson and Kelsay 1991; see also Johnson 1997; Kelsay 2007). 
It is unsurprising that Western interest in non-Western ethics of war has 
come primarily from scholars who have a strong sense of ethical reasoning as 
culturally and historically embedded, dependent on the narratives and self-
understandings of particular communities, because they recognize the potential 
of cultural diversity to generate ethical diversity. This awareness can be seen in a 
brief, chapter length summary of the development of the just war tradition that 
Johnson wrote as part of this comparative work (Johnson 1991). 
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Johnson relates what has become a standard history of the tradition. It takes 
in the Hebraic and Greco-Roman legacy, the influence of Augustine and the 
medieval development of a more self-conscious and systematic tradition, the 
debates around the Spanish conquest of America, and the influence of the 
tradition on modern international law. Throughout the chapter, he emphasizes 
the Western cultural sources of the just war tradition, and the largely insular 
Western context in which it developed. He concludes by reflecting on whether 
the apparent worldwide acceptance of international law on war, substantially 
shaped by just war ideas, signifies an underlying global consensus on justice in 
war, or reflects a continuing Western hegemony. 
Johnson’s assumptions about the moral world make him skeptical of claims 
that the ethics of war can be grounded in “a common law of nature equally 
accessible to all of humankind and equally binding on all,” because past claims to 
have discovered universal principles of natural law turned out to be “historically 
derived from the customary practices of European societies” (1991, 26). His 
answer to the question about international law therefore leans towards the 
judgment that Western hegemony continues, but he has to conclude that we just 
don’t know whether and how far there is a cross-cultural overlapping consensus 
on the ethics of war, because little of the necessary the comparative work has 
been done (see also Johnson 2008).
Johnson’s primary concern in his comparative research has not been with 
the ethnocentrism of international law; rather, it has been the implications 
of communitarian morality in a world in which religious and civilizational 
differences are important influences in international politics. The inseparability 
of ethical discourse from particular, historically constituted traditions tends 
towards “a conception of the world as discretely compartmentalized, with only 
superficial communication possible across the borders between compartments 
– a conception similar to Huntington’s description of competing civilizations, 
though with a good many more fault lines” (Johnson 1997, 8). With these 
divisions comes the potential for conflict, and Johnson approvingly quotes 
Huntington’s argument that taking civilizational differences seriously will 
“require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic 
religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the 
ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require 
an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other 
civilizations” (quoted in Johnson 1997, 6).
If the danger of liberal approaches lies in the temptation to exclude 
meaningful difference through assumptions of a universal ethical rationality, 
communitarian approaches seem to point to a world of incommensurable 
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cultures with no substantive shared principles. It might be questioned whether 
inter-cultural conflict is the inevitable result of such a world: after all, if we take 
seriously the idea that human life is first and foremost shaped by the narratives, 
beliefs and practices of particular communities, then the content of those moral 
communities is likely to be more significant in determining patterns of conflict 
than the mere sociological fact of cultural diversity. But if we allow that a greater 
degree of intercultural cooperation and consensus in the rules regulating the use 
of force would be a good thing, it makes intuitive sense to identify elements of 
commonality in points of contact or overlaps between particular, lived traditions 
(rather than an artificial construction of what people, as rational beings, would 
rationally agree to). This is the spirit that animates much work on the Chinese 
ethics of war that has sought to identify points of contact with the Western just 
war tradition (see, for example, Lo 2012a). In spite of the intuitively appealing 
nature of this project, however, there are some significant difficulties with the 
search for a neutral common ground that are rooted in the very assumptions 
of the communitarian approach that seems to make it necessary. In the next 
sections, we highlight two of these. The first is the problem that the abstract 
nature of an apparent common ground can obscure very significant practical 
divergences in the interpretation of its key principles.
PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMON GROUND I: THE LEGITIMATE 
USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE TIANXIA SYSTEM
The “common ground” identified inevitably involves picking out principles that 
are abstract enough to have analogues in more than one tradition. There is an 
immediate motivational difficulty here. If the goal of finding a cross-cultural 
ethical consensus is to reform the way war is conducted, bringing it into line 
with common moral rules identified, then a very thin, abstract morality is 
unlikely to be effective in accomplishing this, because it needs to be fleshed 
out in more substantive ways to make it meaningful to particular people 
in particular places. Or more accurately, abstract principles will inevitably 
be fleshed out in more substantive ways as they are interpreted against the 
background of existing individual and socially-shared assumptions and 
commitments – and this process is likely to generate very different practical 
orientations. There may be aspects of non-Western paradigms overlap with 
Western norms, but this does not mean that the policy outcomes in non-
Western traditions would automatically be identical to the policies of Western 
leaders. 
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In the case of China’s traditional political thought, there was a hierarchical 
order of ethical significance in accordance with the Sinocentric order, or the 
imperial tributary system. What constituted “just cause” differed, depending on 
not only the geographical distance of violence to the political center, but more 
importantly, on the hierarchy of social relations between the center and its 
periphery. The “Middle Kingdom” might be passive if the objects of the uses of 
forces are socially significantly far from the center. The Sinocentric order refers 
to the philosophical and institutional framework legitimizing the exercise of 
political power in China before the encroachment of Western powers in East Asia 
in the 19th century (Fairbank 1968). It recognized and reinforced China’s East 
Asian hegemony by conceptualizing China as the “Middle Kingdom.” Tributary 
relations were performed through a set of rituals and ceremonies, wherein 
tributary states were required to acknowledge China’s superiority by paying 
tribute to the emperor and adopting Chinese diplomatic etiquette and practices. 
In return, tributary states were able to trade with China through the legalization 
of controlled trade economically, and received validation of their political power 
from the Chinese emperor politically. In this Sinocentric system, the hierarchy 
of social relations is determined by the acceptance of China’s hegemony, the 
acknowledgement of the superiority of the Chinese culture, and the geographical 
distance to the center. It forms several concentric circles. During the Qing 
dynasty for instance, at the center stood the core of China proper. The nearest 
and most culturally similar tributary states such as Korea, Annam (Vietnam) and 
the Ryukyu Islands were located next. Tibet and Central Asia were in the next 
circles. At a further distance were “uncivilized people.”
In this hierarchy of social relations of international society of East Asia, each 
role has clearly defined duties, which was extended from the domestic social 
order within the Chinese imperial system. The Chinese emperor is understood 
to be the Son of Heaven, who possess the moral uprightness and behaves as a 
father-figure. The tributary states needed to perform a virtue of filial piety, or 
devotion of the child to his parents. As such, this tributary system has its model 
in the family, as the family unit is the primary social unit in Confucian political 
thoughts. It comprised three of the “five relationships” including: sovereign-
subject, husband-wife, parent-child, elder brother-younger brother, and friend-
friend. According to Zhang Chi-hsiung (2014), this China-centered hierarchical 
order formed a pattern of interdependence, co-existence and co-prosperity of 
the international society of East Asia wherein the center protected the periphery 
and the periphery was subordinated to the center. This sense of relatedness to 
others, with different roles played out in different relationships, is illustrated in 
Qin Yaqing’s theory of relationality. 
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According to Qin (2016, 36), the IR world is “a web of interrelatedness,” 
wherein “[things], persons, and events coexist in the complex relational context, 
without which none of them would exist at all.” Accordingly, actors in this web 
of interrelatedness, “are and can only be ‘actors-in-relations.’” “[Identities] and 
roles of social actors are shaped by social relations. No absolute, independent 
identity of the self exists: It is constructed and reconstructed in relations 
with others and with the relational totality as a whole” (2016, 36). Therefore, 
this web of interrelatedness is not static but fluid. Based on these underlying 
assumptions, Qin argues that there are two logics of relationality: Firstly, social 
actors are always embedded in “relational circles,” which conduct and constrain 
the ways in which social actors might behave. Secondly, social actors also 
actively make use of the relational circles for instrumental purposes. They act “to 
achieve self-interest, utilizing relational circles to facilitate the achievements of 
instrumental objectives” in terms of both immediate tangible and material gains, 
as well as the long term intangible and nonmaterial, and above all, to maintain 
a social order in which every individually different actors live in harmony (Qin 
2016, 38). 
Therefore, from a perspective of relational theory, power – both soft and hard 
power – is not being possessed by the actors, as most Western IR theorists 
usually presume, but it “comes from relations.” Relations are power. As noted 
by Qin, “it is a process of constantly manipulating and managing one’s relational 
circles to one’s advantage. An actor is more powerful because she has larger 
relational circles, more intimate and important others in these circles, and more 
social prestige because of these circles” (Qin 2016, 42). The relational power is 
then closely connected to the term of mianzi 面子 (face or reputation) in Chinese 
tradition. If one has mianzi  then one is powerful in changing the attitude 
and behavior of others to conform to one’s will. Accordingly, “the favor giver 
does not expect a symmetrical or reciprocal transaction in terms of material 
payoffs; rather she seeks social capital such as face/reputation or merely desires 
reinforcement of the ties over long terms” (Qin 2016, 42). Governance, in this 
respect, is “a process of negotiating sociopolitical arrangements that manage 
complex relationships in a community to produce order so that members behave 
in a reciprocal and cooperative manner with mutual trust evolved over a shared 
understanding of social norms and human morality” (Qin 2016, 43). From the 
relational theory’s perspective, China’s rhetoric on the legitimate use of force 
is more concerned with its relational circles, incorporating more intimate and 
important actors in these circles and gain more social prestige – or a “relational 
power” – in order to (re)shape the attitude and behavior of other states to 
conform to its will.
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This is an elemental difference between Western and Chinese ethical thinking 
on the legitimate use of force. While recent versions of the Western tradition 
seek to abstract from specific cases principles that notionally valid across time 
and space and applicable to all analogous cases, the Chinese tradition analyses 
specific cases in relation to the complex logics and decision-making rules 
entrenched in the social relations of the Sinocentric order. It is the imperial 
tributary system at the center of Chinese ethical thought, not the abstract 
individual subject as an isolated decision-maker, as in the modern Western 
liberal tradition. The mix of paradigms in Chinese rhetoric of ethics of war often 
leads to policy outcomes different from those of the West that determine the 
questions of what kind of use of military force is morally acceptable, when to 
wage war and under what conditions, who is authorized to employ it, how to 
fight it and what are limits, and how to restore peace after the use of military 
force, etc. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMON GROUND II: ‘INTERCIVILIZA-
TIONAL PEACE’ AND THE TIANXIA SYSTEM
As shown in the previous section, although there are aspects in which the 
non-Western paradigm overlaps with Western norms, this does not mean 
that the policy outcomes in non-Western traditions would automatically be 
identical to the policies of Western leaders. Even more seriously though, the 
project of searching for a common ground may undermine the authority of the 
substantive ethical traditions it is abstracting principles from. If the common 
ground identified is to be authoritative, the principles identified must either 
carry significant weight in the included traditions, or they must have extra 
or overriding authority on the grounds that they are shared in common. 
However, every tradition must weigh the relative importance of different values 
and principles that may generate competing moral demands in particular 
circumstances, and give priority to some over others. These decisions are made 
differently in different traditions, depending on their ultimate presuppositions 
about the final goals of ethical action. Moreover, analogous principles may 
be present in different traditions, but they may be central in one tradition yet 
marginal in others. How are these tensions to be negotiated? 
One possible resolution is to treat the substantive commonalities as having 
an authority independent of their standing and authority in the traditions 
they have been taken from, simply on the basis that they are shared, or that 
they are more universal than other principles that may be given priority in the 
The Tianxia System and the Search for a Common Ground in the Comparative Ethics of  War | 161
substantive traditions they have been taken from. It might then be claimed that 
where the emphases of the common ground conflict with specific emphases on 
more established traditions, the common ground should have priority. This, 
however, amounts to a new version of the ethics of war that has its own grounds; 
in the encounter between traditions, they are relativized as less universal than 
the morality assembled from the overlaps between them, and we are back with 
something like Rawls’ overlapping consensus. But why should an proponent 
of the just war tradition, or someone persuaded by, say Confucian conceptions 
of war, prefer this new ethics? For many communitarians who work on non-
Western ethics of war, one possible response might be to claim that the common 
ground is a step towards inter-civilizational peace, and arguments can be found 
in each tradition that support this goal. But this returns us to the problem that 
“intercivilizational peace” might look and be organized very differently from the 
perspective of different traditions, with their own ultimate commitments and 
presuppositions. 
In the case of China for instance, “intercivilizational peace” could potentially 
refer to a return to the Tianxia system. In the 1960s or 1970s, considerations 
about the Tianxia  system and its influence upon the international system were 
discussed mainly from a historical standpoint. Today’s discussion is however 
more on the contemporary relevance of the Tianxia  system accompany to 
China’s rising (Zhao 2006). Zhao Yingyan (2005), the most prominent Chinese 
scholar today in discussing how China would change the world order through the 
application of Tianxia, argues that the Tianxia should replace the Westphalian 
system, which he argues is a source of contemporary international conflicts. 
Contrary to the Western vision of international relations, the Sinocentric world 
order recognizes the factual inequality of power among states. Order is therefore 
maintained through the administration of a benign hegemonic power personified 
by the emperor as the Son of Heaven, and for the benefit of “all under heaven,” 
or the oneness of the universe. This political principle of ‘inclusion of all’ in the 
world implies the acceptance of the diversities in the world where no one is 
treated as an outsider. The emphasis of Tianxia is accordingly not on military 
power but on the voluntarily acceptation of the system by other states, according 
to Zhao. The concept of Tianxia is therefore the Chinese ideal of perpetual peace. 
The idea of Tianxia as form of perpetual peace is supported empirically by David 
Kang’s (2010) historical studies of the period between the founding of the Ming 
dynasty in 1368 and the outbreak of the Opium Wars in 1841. Kang argues that 
China’s traditional hierarchical order was much more peaceful than Europe’s 
egalitarian Westphalian system. According to Kang, the major countries in East 
Asia including Korea, Vietnam and Japan during this time have long-lasting 
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peaceful relationships with one another. There are only two large-scale conflicts 
in the region between these four countries. Kang (2007; 2010) attributes this 
peace to the Tianxia system, wherein it maintained stability in East Asia by 
fostering diplomatic and commercial exchange through the tributary system. 
Coherent with this desire to reinvigorate the concept of Tianxia  in a 
contemporary light, some Chinese scholars such as Guo Sanzhuan or Wei 
Zhijiang argue for its compatibility and its potential role within the international 
rule of law and security system. As shown in the previous section, scholars refer 
to different schools of thought in pre-Qin era such as Confucianism, Mosim, and 
Taoism, which are all very cautious to wage wars based on material self-interests. 
Likewise, Qin Yaqin (2016) also develops his conception of relationality from 
a Chinese perspective with a focus of the zhongyong 中庸 and yin/yang 陰陽 
dialectics. According to Qin, both the Western and Chinese political thought 
conceptualize the universe in a polar way. However, the Western traditions see 
the two opposite poles as independent categories structured in a dichotomous 
and conflictual way – i.e. thesis versus antithesis. In the Chinese tradition 
on the contrary, the two opposite poles are structured in an immanent and 
mutually inclusive way (Qin 2016, 39). Accordingly, in zhongyong dialectics 
“the two opposites interacting in an immanently inclusive way, depending and 
complementing each other for full expression and for life, and co-evolving into a 
new synthesis through dynamic processes which keep on maintaining, adjusting, 
and managing complex and fluid human relations so as to reach the ideal state 
of harmony” (Qin 2016, 41). Consequently, the desire of the aforementioned 
Chinese scholars is therefore to go beyond the current principle of nation-
states in order to form a “new understanding of international legal order and 
rule of law at the international level” (Guo 2015). The key belief of Tianxia’s 
sympathizers contend that the Chinese world order was more peaceful and civil 
because of its the inclusiveness of the concept and righteousness aspect of the 
order it would bring to the world. 
Nevertheless, Chinese scholars’ attempts to reinvigorate the concept of Tianxia 
have not been widely shared in the West. Those critics have questioned the 
extent to which China is placing its own imprint on the global stage (Callahan 
2008; Johnston and Ross 2006; Shambaugh 2006; Shirk 2007; Jonhston 
2008). They argue that Chinese centrality in history was maintained mostly 
by military conquests (Johnston 1995; Perdue 2010; Westad 2012). Today, 
behind the “benign” world order and the promotion of peace under the Tianxia 
system lie issues such as the creation of a new hegemony; that is: China 
virtually leading the world the way in which the United States is doing within 
the current international order. Callahan, for instance, contended that China 
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would originally remain a “status quo power that is unlikely to challenge the 
international system” (Callahan 2011). However, the re-emergence of Tianxia 
concept as an idealized version of China’s imperial past has inspired a range of 
Chinese scholars and policymakers in formulating ambitious, if not aggressive 
plans for China’s future. Therefore, to Callahan, a selective reading of the past 
by intellectuals like Zhao and others extolls the Chinese world order while 
voluntarily disregarding what did not work and ignoring the flaws of the system. 
For Callahan, this is the basis of Beijing’s desire to promote a so-called post-
hegemonic international system, based on “universally desirable Chinese 
values” (Callahan 2011). This is, of course, the central problem: any project of 
intercivilizational peace will inevitably be a particular project launched from a 
specific standpoint. There is no neutral way to justify such a project, and because 
it is therefore a substantive ethical project in itself, it is a participant in global 
ethical diversity rather than a neutral mediator.
CONCLUSION
The communitarian search for points of contact and common ground between 
traditions that can create the basis for shared global standards in the ethics of 
war cannot succeed, as any common ground it identifies will always be fleshed 
out in more substantive terms from within the “thick” moral cultures it tries 
to unite. But if the thick moral cultures that create the need for a common 
ground ultimately undermine it, they also point the way to an alternative angle 
of approach to the comparative ethics of war. Communitarian approaches 
emphasise the inescapably embedded situation of individual ethical subjects 
in particular moral communities and traditions. If we follow through with this 
logic, it should be clear that those engaged in the comparative ethics of war are 
also embedded in specific moral traditions. This raises the question of what the 
comparative ethics of war might look like from within the moral traditions that 
have shaped Western and Chinese applied ethics of war.
Of course, we already have a partial answer to this question in the shape of 
liberal approaches, which define the agenda, goals and terms of encounter. 
The problem here is not with the fact that liberal theorists have an ontology 
and epistemology through which the meaning, nature and significance of 
ethical pluralism is implicitly understood, and through which the comparative 
encounter is organized. The problem is rather with the claim to be standing 
outside traditions and cultures, charting and evaluating their contents and 
contacts, when in reality there is no view from nowhere. The communitarian 
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work described above falls into the same trap insofar as the context, purpose 
and goals of the comparative work itself are not defined from the standpoint of 
a particular tradition. In a sense, it sets aside its communitarianism and adopts 
the context-free rationality of liberalism, creating an awkward tension with 
the communitarian premises that guide the understanding of the traditions 
being studied. An approach to the Chinese ethics of war that took seriously its 
communitarian premises would either engage with Chinese traditions from 
within the terms of another tradition, or engage with other traditions from a 
standpoint informed by Confucian or Taoist ontological and epistemological 
traditions. Such an approach of course has its own dangers, not least the risk that 
intercultural engagement in the ethics of war will succumb to the temptation 
to claim “victory” by positioning others entirely within the terms of one’s own 
tradition, a strategy that precludes meaningful dialogue. It seems less dangerous 
than refusing to acknowledge that all work in the ethics of war is conditioned 
by a certain cultural standpoint, though, and would promote a more honest 
recognition of what is involved in cross-cultural discussion in the ethics of war. 
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